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A PRIMER ON RISK
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
FOR LEGAL DECISION-MAKERS
Preface
This primer is addressed to judges, parole board members, and other legal decisionmakers who use or are considering using the results of risk assessment instruments (RAIs) in
making determinations about post-conviction dispositions, as well as to legislators and
executive officials responsible for authorizing such use. * It is meant to help these decisionmakers determine whether a particular RAI is an appropriate basis for legal determinations and
whether evaluators who rely on an RAI have done so properly. This primer does not take a
position on whether RAIs should be integrated into the criminal process. Rather, it provides
legal decision-makers with information about how RAIs are constructed and the types of
information they provide, with the goal of facilitating their intelligent selection and use.
The work on the Primer was funded by the Charles H. Koch Foundation. It involved
consultation with a number of experts on risk assessment, including Dr. Sarah Desmarais, a
psychologist and professor at North Carolina State University; Brandon Garrett, a law professor
at Duke Law School; Melissa Hamilton, a law professor at the University of Surrey; Dr. Rhys
Hester, a sociologist, lawyer and professor at Clemson University; Cecelia Klingele, a law
professor at the University of Wisconsin; Sandra Mayson, a law professor at the University of
Georgia Law School; Dr. John Monahan, a psychologist and professor at the University of Virginia
Law School; Michael O’Hear, a law professor at Marquette Law School; Kevin Reitz, a law
professor at the University of Minnesota Law School; Dr. Jennifer Skeem, a psychologist and
professor at the University of California, Berkeley; and Dr. Megan Stevenson, an economist and
professor at the University of Virginia Law School. However, the ultimate responsibility for this
work falls on the author of the Primer, Christopher Slobogin, law professor at Vanderbilt
University. Any errors in concept or fact are his, and his alone.

*

Much of what is said here could be relevant to use of risk assessment instruments during the pretrial process as well, but this
primer is directly solely at decision-makers involved with risk assessment in the post-conviction process.
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WHAT ARE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS?

is composed of 20 items, rated on a scale of 0-2. 2
Examples of adjusted actuarial instruments are
the Correctional Offender Management Profiling
for Alternative Sanctions tool (COMPAS), 3 and
the Legal Service/Case Management Inventory
(hereafter, LSCMI). 4 Examples of actuarial
instruments are the Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide-Revised (hereafter, VRAG), 5 Virginia’s
Non-Violent Risk Assessment (NVRA), 6 and the
STATIC-99. 7 These examples are fluid, however.
For instance, if evaluators so choose, the LSCMI
can be used as an actuarial instrument, and the
scores on the VRAG and STATIC-99 can be
adjusted.

The term “risk assessment” encompasses a number of different practices that differ
in the extent to which they: (1) rely on
empirically-valid risk and protective factors (i.e.,
factors that statistically correlate with an
elevated or reduced risk of reoffending); (2) use
a structured method for measuring these risk
and protective factors; (3) establish a procedure
for combining scores on the individual risk and
protective factors into a total score; and (4)
produce a final estimate of risk. 1 Clinical risk
assessment—in many settings, the traditional
and still typical method used by many judges,
parole boards and mental health professionals—
structures none of these components; rather an
estimate of risk is based on experience and
perhaps intuition, and the factors considered
may vary from case-to-case, and be applied
differently in different cases. Checklist risk
assessment provides structure on the first
component, by listing the factors that should be
considered. Structured professional judgment
(SPJ) risk assessment satisfies the first two
components, by providing a list of factors and
indicating how they should be measured (e.g., on
a scale of 0-2), but avoids combining these
measures for a total score, instead counselling
that the item ratings be considered merely in
arriving at an overall conclusion about risk.
Adjusted actuarial risk assessment lists the
factors, describes how they should be measured,
and produces a total score, but allows evaluators
to adjust or modify the score based on clinical
judgment that is not structured by the
instrument.
Stand-alone
actuarial
risk
assessment does not permit such adjustments,
but rather produces a probability estimate that
is considered final.

RAIs are based on research that tries to
identify factors that correlate with risk. Typical
risk factors in RAIs include criminal history,
diagnosis, criminal attitudes, school and work
status, and substance use. 8 Risk factors are
sometimes distinguished in terms of whether
they are “static” (unchanging) or “dynamic”
(changeable). Some RAIs also claim to identify
“needs,” which, properly defined, are dynamic
factors that, if changed, reduce risk. For
instance, employment status and substance
abuse are dynamic factors that can be helpful in
estimating risk but, to date, only substance
abuse has clearly been shown to be a
criminogenic need—that is, one that, if
successfully treated, reduces risk. 9
CONTROVERSIES
INSTRUMENTS

OVER

RISK ASSESSMENT

As indicated in the preface, this primer
does not take a position on whether RAIs should
be used in the criminal justice system. However,
legal decision-makers who use or are considering
using these tools should have some
understanding of the criticisms of RAIs and how
RAI proponents have responded to these
criticisms. The criticisms, and the responses to
them, are organized here under six headings:
assessing individual cases based on group data;
the helpfulness of RAIs to lay decision-makers;

The term “risk assessment instrument,”
as used here, applies only to the last three types
of practices. An example of an SPJ instrument is
the HCR-20, version3 (hereafter, HCR-20), which
4

racial disparities; use of uncontrollable factors;
dispositional consequences; and procedural
concerns.

However, the fact that the G2i
phenomenon
is unavoidable does have
implications for how to frame prediction results.
A conclusion based on an RAI (or any other
conclusion about risk) should not purport to say
that a person will, or will not, reoffend—a fact
that, in almost all cases, is unknowable. Nor
should it state that a particular offender has X
probability of reoffending. Rather, an evaluator
using an RAI to estimate the risk an offender
poses should report that the offender received a
risk score that is consistent with the scores of a
group, X percent of which offended in the past. 15

Assessing Individual Cases Based on Group Data
RAIs—especially those that are
actuarial—have been criticized on the ground
that research about groups cannot predict
whether a given individual will reoffend. As one
judge put this point, “[n]ot only are . . . statistics
concerning the violent behavior of others
irrelevant, but it seems to me wrong to confine
any person on the basis not of that persons’ own
prior conduct but on the basis of statistical
evidence regarding the behavior of other
people.” 10 This issue has been called the “G2i”
problem, the application of general information
to individual cases. 11

The Helpfulness of RAIs
The statistical expertise needed to put
together an actuarial RAI and the familiarity with
research literature that goes into the creation of
SPJ instruments requires a significant amount of
specialized knowledge. But if judges or layparole boards are able to figure out who will
reoffend as accurately as evaluators using RAIs,
then arguably that specialized knowledge is not
helpful to the factfinder. One study purported to
find that the COMPAS “is no more accurate or
fair than predictions made by people with little
or no criminal justice expertise.” 16 Specifically it
found, based on a comparison of COMPAS and
human predictions for 1,000 defendants, that
while the COMPAS was correct in 65% of the
cases, humans were correct in about 62% of the
cases. 17

The statistical argument purporting to
support the stance that G2i is not possible has
been debunked by noted statisticians Peter
Imrey and Philip Dawid, who find it “seriously
mistaken in many particulars” and who conclude
that it should “play no role in reasoned
discussions about violence recidivism risk
assessment.” 12
Other commentators have
pointed out that, if these assertions were true,
any type of expert testimony—whether or not
empirically based—would be suspect. 13 Even a
clinical risk assessment by a judge or mental
health professional relies—consciously or not—
on stereotypes, past experiences with “similar”
individuals, and lessons learned from the
literature about groups. As one commentator
noted: “Although the clinician need not identify
in advance the characteristics he will regard as
salient, he must nevertheless evaluate the
applicant on the basis of a finite number of
salient characteristics, and thus, like the
statistical decisionmaker, he treats the applicant
as a member of a class defined by those
characteristics.” 14

However, others have pointed out that
the 50 mini-vignettes shown to the lay subjects
in this study listed only a few features of the
defendant, all of which have a robust statistical
relationship with reoffending; in effect the
subjects were provided a “checklist” RAI.
Further, immediately after each prediction, the
subjects were told whether they were right or
wrong, feedback that a judge or parole board
never receives but which, in the study, “trained”
the participants about the most pertinent traits
and how they are related to recidivism. 18 A
5

follow-up study found that when lay participants
are not provided feedback, they do much more
poorly than an RAI, even when they are given
base rate information about the average rate of
offending of the population in question. 19 The
authors of this study also found that when the
information given the humans was “noisier”
(that is, when a much richer set of facts was
provided than the barebones list of traits
provided in the original study), the lay subjects
did barely better than chance, whereas the
statistical model the authors created was much
better at distinguishing recidivists and nonrecidivists. 20

become disabled, or when a person considered
low risk voices a genuine threat to another). 25
Of course, the advantages of RAIs over
clinical judgment are lost if they are poorly
constructed. The validity of an RAI can be
measured in several ways. Further, RAIs must
also be validated and re-validated on the
relevant populations. These means of gauging
accuracy are described further below.
Racial Disparities
Risk assessment instruments might be
considered unfair on a number of grounds. Most
prominently, critics have argued that RAIs can
perpetuate racially disparate effects.
For
instance, RAIs may be developed using criminal
arrest history that, because of racialized police
practices, overestimates the actual crime rates
by people of color, and therefore may produce
results indicating that this group is higher risk
than it actually is.26 Further, research has shown
that even RAIs that assign risk levels relatively
accurately across races can produce higher “false
positive rates” † for blacks than for whites, and
higher “false negative rates” ‡ for whites than
blacks; if so, a higher proportion of blacks could
be wrongly incarcerated or receive enhanced
sentences, while a higher proportion of whites
could be released and reoffend. More generally,
risk factors such as employment status, socioeconomic status, or location may correlate with
race, which some critics argue should render
reliance on such factors impermissible, and
perhaps even unconstitutional. 27

These types of results replicate a large
number of other studies finding that algorithms
typically outperform human predictions,
whether the latter are made by laypeople or
trained clinicians. 21 For instance, a 2006 metaanalysis of 41 studies found that actuarial
techniques routinely did better than clinical
methods in every area investigated, and that
with respect to predicting violent or criminal
behavior in particular, the actuarial approach
was “clearly superior to the clinical approach.” 22
The study also found that even subsets of “best
professionals” designated as experts did not
outperform statistical formulae. 23
Several
studies that compare algorithms to judges,
clinicians, and correctional officers obtain similar
results, probably because, despite their official
position, the decisions of these groups are often
like other peoples’—largely intuitive, heuristicbased, subject to bias, and inattentive to base
rates. 24 This research calls into question both
clinical risk assessment and actuarial assessment
that is adjusted, at least when the adjustments
are not based on empirical research or on
obvious anomalies (such as when a person
designated as high risk for violence has since

To some extent, the effects of racialized
policing can be neutralized. For instance, some
algorithms refrain from predicting arrests for
minor drug offenses and non-violent misdemeanors, while others develop separate risk
categories for different racial groups, and still

†

‡

The percentage of people who did not recidivate but had
been predicted to recidivate (i.e., given a positive
prediction).

The percentage of people who recidivated but had been
predicted to not recidivate (i.e., given a negative
prediction).
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score). Critics argue that punishment should not
be enhanced because of such factors, or even by
factors such as “criminal attitudes” and
impulsivity, since they are not per se criminal. 38

others exclude risk factors that are not equally
predictive across racial groups. 28 Unfortunately,
higher false positive rates for blacks are
inevitable as a statistical matter if, as some
research shows, 29 the recidivism rate is higher
among blacks than whites. 30 Further, adjusting
scores in an effort to equalize false positive and
false negative rates across races will decrease
the accuracy of RAIs by over-estimating the risk
posed by whites and under-estimating the risk
posed by blacks; in any event, simultaneous
equalization of both false positive and false
negative rates may be impossible. 31 And under
current constitutional doctrine, unintentional
disparate racial impact does not violate the
equal protection clause, 32 especially if the risk
factors that correlate with race meaningfully
improve accuracy and thus help achieve the
state’s interest in protecting the public. 33

At the same time, the courts have long
recognized that post-conviction dispositional
decisions—including the death penalty—may be
based in part on a risk assessment; 39 if so, a riskbased disposition that is not prolonged beyond
what an offender fairly deserves under the
relevant sentencing scheme should be
permissible even if based in whole or part on
non-blameworthy factors. 40 It has also been
argued that risk-based dispositions are imposed
not because a person is young, male, or has a
particular personality disorder, but because
these factors, along with others, indicate that
the person is more (or less) likely to choose to
commit a blameworthy act in the future. 41
Viewed this way, risk factors are merely
circumstantial
evidence
about
future
blameworthiness.
Finally—repeating
the
comparative theme—even non-empirical risk
assessments undoubtedly rely, consciously or
not, on such factors.

Finally, consistent with the research
showing that RAIs are generally more accurate
than clinical judgment, several studies indicate
that human adjustments to RAIs increase racially
disparate outcomes. 34 It may be that structured
risk assessment is better at avoiding such
outcomes than unaided human decisionmakers. 35 Further, because the workings of an
algorithm are more transparent than those of
the human mind, if racially disparate impacts are
discovered, they are more easily corrected using
RAIs. 36 As Sendhil Mullainathan has noted,
“biased algorithms are easier to fix than biased
people.” 37

It is sometimes stated that, as long as a
risk assessment is used only to identify lower risk
offenders who can be given a reduced sentence
or diverted from imprisonment altogether,
concerns about the use of particular risk factors
are alleviated. 42 However, the tension between
risk and desert is not that easily resolved. For
instance, a jurisdiction that lowers the sentence
of an older woman who is married based on
those factors is, in effect, raising the sentence of
a younger, single male. A regime that favors low
risk offenders automatically disfavors high-risk
offenders.

Use of Uncontrollable Factors.
A related criticism of RAIs is that many of
their risk factors do not describe blameworthy
conduct. For instance, although no RAI explicitly
uses race as a risk factor, several use sex (with
maleness increasing the risk score), age (with
youth increasing the risk score), diagnosis (with
certain personality disorders increasing the risk
score), and early childhood experiences (with
abuse and parental absence increasing the risk

Dispositional Consequences
An over-arching concern about using
RAIs is that they will make risk a more salient
consideration during the post-conviction
7

process, to the detriment of achieving other
punishment goals. 43 The focus will become
reduction
of
recidivism
rather
than
proportionate punishment based on just desert,
general deterrence, rehabilitation or other,
more broad-based efforts to reduce crime
through social programs. Further, that focus
could lead to an increase in imprisonment and
sentence lengths, given the fact that all
offenders pose some risk if released. Finally,
there is the concern that, because they control
the construction of RAIs, tool developers, not
policymakers, will control the definition of risk. 44

ment norms, some critics express worry that the
quantified nature of RAIs, and the fact that their
inner workings are not easily understood,
undermines the procedural fairness of the risk
determination. 50 Basing a risk assessment on a
finite number of factors and, when the
assessment is actuarial in nature, on a risk or
probability score, may seem antithetical to an
“individualized” evaluation of the person.
Further, to the extent the algorithm is not
transparent—which may occur either because it
was developed by a private company claiming
trade secret protection or because the RAI is
based on deep machine learning (artificial
intelligence) techniques—independent due
process concerns arise. 51 These challenges are
exacerbated if, as is true in most jurisdictions,
the rules governing admissibility of scientific
evidence, such as those developed under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 52 do
not apply post-conviction, and if, as is true with
parole hearings, the proceeding is informal, with
no right to counsel.

Proponents of RAIs respond that, while
all of this is a possible effect of increased reliance
on RAIs, the more likely impact is a reduction in
incarceration rates and sentence lengths, and an
increase in rehabilitative services. 45
For
instance, researchers with bipartisan credentials
who audited the compositions of the prison
populations in three states estimated that, if
danger to the community were the only
justification for continued confinement, roughly
half the prisoners would be released. 46 If low risk
is defined as those posing a risk of violent crime
below the average risk posed by offenders, and
this group is either not imprisoned or imprisoned
for the minimum term, incarceration
populations are likely to be significantly reduced,
for people of color as well as other groups; 47
research shows that recidivism among low risk
individuals actually diminishes if imprisonment
and enhanced surveillance are avoided. 48
Further, to the extent RAIs identify criminogenic
needs, they can facilitate assignment to
treatment programs.
As these examples
illustrate, policymakers, not RAI developers,
must dictate the specifications of the
instruments. 49

The extent to which these challenges
can be overcome depends upon the law and
practice in a given jurisdiction. At a minimum,
the subject of the risk assessment should always
be able to contest the accuracy of conclusions
that a given risk factor (such as a particular
arrest) applies, as well as the way in which the
risk factors are combined.
Legal decisionmakers can assist in this process, especially when
counsel is not present. Explanations of the risk
assessment process should also be provided, and
the workings of the RAI should be made as
transparent as possible.
Perhaps most
importantly, the validity of any given RAI used by
the state should be subject to peer review and
testing before it is relied on to make legal
decisions, which can help minimize concerns
about the informality of the post-conviction
process. These matters are discussed further
below.

Procedural Concerns
Even if RAIs are relevant and helpful, and
their use does not violate equality or punish8

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RISK ASSESSMENT
With these controversies in mind, and as explained further in the next section, several general
principles should govern the criminal justice system’s reliance on risk assessment instruments (RAIs)
during the post-conviction process.
1. Legal policymakers (legislatures, executive agencies or courts) should define the threshold
and nature of the risk that is relevant for each risk assessment setting (e.g., sentencing,
parole release, within-in prison management). Policymakers should not cede this authority
to the developers of RAIs.
2. Developers of RAIs should provide validation data indicating: (a) the proportion of people
within each risk category or with a given risk score who reoffend, as defined under principle
1; (b) the ability of the RAI to discriminate between recidivists and non-recidivists above
chance levels; and (c) inter-rater reliability (agreement between different evaluators).
3. The validation data should, if possible, be based on a population from the jurisdiction in
question and report data about the validity measures described in principle 2 for men,
women, different ethnicities and other important demographic groups.
4. Jurisdictions should verify the predictive validity and inter-rater reliability data described in
principles 2 and 3 through a peer-review process that is independent from the developer of
the RAI and that has access to the developer’s inputs, statistical analysis, and outcome data.
5. Jurisdictions should re-validate the RAI after significant changes in the relevant population,
the rate of crime, and norms or policies that are likely to affect recidivism rates
substantially.
6. Risk estimates based on an RAI should be expressed in terms of membership in a group with
a specified recidivism rate, not in terms of whether a particular person will or will not
recidivate.
7. In estimating risk, the results of a validated risk assessment instrument are preferable to a
clinical judgment about risk and should be given presumptive, but rebuttable, effect.
8. Legal decision-makers and evaluators should be trained in the use of RAIs to the extent they
are responsible for obtaining and analyzing their results.
9. In individual cases, the risk factors and the way in which they influence the ultimate
conclusion on risk should be available to the parties and subject to adversarial testing.
10. The results of a risk assessment should not lengthen a sentence beyond the maximum
punishment that the legislature has determined is appropriate for the offense of conviction.
11. To the extent consistent with just desert, general deterrence and other punishment
considerations, decision-makers charged with responding to a risk assessment should
impose the least burdensome measures that can sufficiently address risk, which may mean,
for instance, that offenders considered to be lower risk are subject to little or no
intervention.
12. When consistent with other goals of punishment, legal decision-makers should consider
supportive measures to reduce risk, including access to treatment, education or social
services. To this end, RAI developers should endeavor to include variable or dynamic risk
factors that have been shown empirically to predict re-offending and to be changeable
through intervention.
The queries highlighted below elaborate on these principles.
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ISSUES THAT LEGAL DECISION-MAKERS USING
RAIS SHOULD CONSIDER

Unfortunately, in-depth analysis of this
sort has, to date, been rare. To the extent a
jurisdiction’s law defines dangerousness in the
sentencing context, it is usually very imprecise.
For instance, the relevant law might describe the
relevant threshold as a “probability” or
“significant possibility” of reoffending, without
further elaboration. 53

The following material expands on these
principles, organized around 15 questions about
RAIs that relate to their (1) relevance, (2)
accuracy, and (3) fairness. Whether these
queries are resolved on a case-by-case or
jurisdiction-wide basis will depend upon the law
and practice of the jurisdiction.

With the advent of RAIs, risk can be
quantified more precisely.
Not all RAI
developers take advantage of this capability,
however. Instead, evidence of risk is often
limited to statements about whether the
offender is “high risk,” “medium risk” or “low
risk” (as occurs under the HCR-20) or a
description of the offender’s “risk decile” (as
provided by the COMPAS). These statements do
not reveal the specific group-based probabilities
associated with, respectively, the instruments’
risk designation or decile.

Relevance/Fit
In evaluating the results of an RAI, the
legal decision-maker should ascertain whether
the information it provides is pertinent to the
legal issue in question, with respect to: (1) the
probability of reoffending; (2) the type of
reoffending predicted; (3) the time frame
within which the reoffending will occur; and (4)
the intervention(s) that are likely to reduce the
predicted risk.

Legal decision-makers should seek out
such information rather than rely on categorical
designations such as “high” or “low” risk.
Otherwise, there is a significant chance they will
be misled. For instance, surveys that ask
clinicians and judges how they define “high risk”
show tremendous variation.
The average
percentage associated with that phrase falls
somewhere between 60 and 70%, but the range
of answers varies from 5% to 100% and the
variability between raters is very high. 54 One
study of evaluators found that the probability of
recidivating associated with a “moderate-high”
rating was more than twice the actual recidivism
rate of those groups.55 Similarly, the decile
designation does not provide sufficient
information about probabilities. For instance,
“third decile” on the COMPAS does not refer to
a group, 30% of whom will recidivate, but rather
a group that, in the validation sample, posed a
lower risk than roughly 70% of the sample;
because even the highest decile group on the
COMPAS is associated with a probability of

1. Does the RAI provide information about
the probability that a person within the
individual’s risk category will recidivate?
As noted above, the most accurate way
to designate a person’s risk level is by associating
the person with a group, as in “research
indicates that approximately 30% of the people
with this person’s risk score recidivated in the
absence of risk-reducing intervention.” This
probability is also the most useful information
for the binary decision that a judge makes about
whether a person should be sent to prison or
diverted to an alternative, or that a parole board
makes in deciding whether to release a prisoner.
Ideally, as principle #1 indicates, the legislature
or appellate jurisprudence would assist in that
endeavor by providing probability thresholds
appropriate for the legal setting (which might
vary depending on whether sentencing, parole,
or within-prison dispositions are involved), after
considering the associated false positive and
false negative rates, and the accompanying
imprisonment and treatment costs.
10

reoffending considerably lower than 100%, the
third decile group is very likely associated with a
reoffending risk much lower than 30%.

arrests as an outcome variable may rate black
defendants as higher risk than white defendants
who will engage in similar criminal behavior.
While that rating might be “validated” because
blacks have been and will be arrested for more
drug possession and misdemeanor crimes than
whites, they in fact have not committed more
such crimes, and so the risk differential between
whites and blacks will not reflect reality.

2. Is the type of conduct that the RAI
predicts relevant to the legal decision at
issue?
Just as the law often only vaguely
defines the probability threshold, it may not
indicate the outcome measure or outcome
variable of interest for the legal setting in
question. Should the person be considered
“dangerous” for legal purposes if it is shown,
with the requisite probability, that someone in
the person’s risk category will be arrested for any
offense? Or only if the person will be convicted
for a violent offense? And, if the latter, how is
violence defined?
These questions are not
always answered in the relevant legislation or
caselaw. If not, legal decision-makers evaluating
individual cases must make their own judgment
about this issue.

Violent offending can also be defined in
many ways. 58 Some RAIs include within this term
any assault or threat of violence, while others
may limit that term to homicide, rape, robbery
and aggravated assault, or to crimes involving
victim injury. Again, the legal decision-maker
should find out the outcome variable for the RAI
in question and take that information into
account when making a decision about whether
a person poses sufficient risk to warrant
different legal treatment. It has been argued
that, where significant deprivations of liberty are
involved, 59 violent crime is the appropriate
outcome focus, a position that can significantly
reduce the number of people considered high
risk. 60

While many RAIs provide probabilities
for both “general recidivism” and “violent
recidivism,” many define those terms very
broadly. General recidivism, for instance, could
be defined in terms of arrest for any crime (as is
the case for the COMPAS, for instance). Other
RAIs might include as the outcome variable
infractions of prison disciplinary rules. In such
cases, the legal decision-maker must ask
whether the probability of re-arrest for a
misdemeanor, or the commission of any prison
infraction, even if high, justifies the legal
intervention being considered (e.g., lengthened
imprisonment).

3. Is the time frame associated with the
predicted conduct consistent with the
legal decision at issue?
In many legal settings, the legal decisionmaker is attempting to forecast reoffending
within a limited period of time. For instance, a
judge may be sentencing an offender for a crime
with a maximum sentence of one year, or a
parole board may be considering the risk posed
by an individual between the time of its decision
and the next parole review period a year or two
hence. The risk information provided by some
RAIs may not be relevant in such settings. For
instance, while the COMPAS provides probability
estimates for a period of one to two years, the
HCR-20’s time frame is two years, and the
VRAG’s time frame is seven years. Legal decisionmakers should take this type of durational

Additionally, for reasons suggested
above, the decision-maker should keep in mind
that using low-level arrests as an outcome
measure can produce racially disparate results, 56
and that a sizeable number of arrests do not
result in convictions. 57 As a result, an RAI that
relies on drug possession or misdemeanor
11

criterion into account in making decisions based
on the results of an RAI.

for these types of reasons, several
commentators have proposed that, for
individuals considered low risk, there be a
presumption in favor of alternatives to prison or
outright release. 64

4. Does the RAI provide information about
the effect of different types of
interventions on the individual’s risk
categorization?

Accuracy/Validity
Legal decision-makers should seek
assurances that RAIs on which they rely are
valid (i.e., do what they purport to do) in the
following senses: (1) calibration; (2)
discrimination between high and low risk
individuals; (3) local validation; and (4) interrater reliability. Further, they should seek
assurance that (5) these measures of validity
are current. Such assurances may come from
outside entities (e.g., state agencies,
independent peer reviewers, appellate courts);
validity determinations do not necessarily need
to be made by the legal decision-maker in
individual cases. However, legal decisionmakers should have an obligation to ensure
that, in individual cases: (6) evaluators are
trained in the use of the RAI and reliably score
the RAI; and (7) any adjustments to the RAI
score have a substantial empirical or legal basis.

An individual’s risk of reoffending can
vary enormously depending on the law’s
response to the risk. While imprisonment might
substantially reduce risk, it may not be any more
effective at doing so than placement in an
effective substance abuse treatment program in
the community, a vocational training program in
a halfway house, or a job-release program
coupled with an ankle monitor. Some RAIs, like
the HCR-20 and the LSCMI, attempt to provide
information about an individual’s criminogenic
needs that can help make such determinations.
RAIs that focus solely on protective factors such
as coping skills and supportive social networks
are also available to legal decision-makers. 61
These RAIs can be very helpful in fashioning
dispositions, although legal decision-makers
should make sure to inquire about and attempt
to take into account whether a given risk or
needs factors is “causal,” in the sense that
changing or responding to it will reduce risk (as
opposed to merely “improve” a person). For
instance,
as
noted
earlier,
while
effective substance abuse treatment can have
a significant impact on risk, standard
psychotherapies are much less likely to do so.

5. What evidence is provided about the
RAI’s calibration?
There are two primary means of
evaluating the accuracy or predictive validity of
an algorithm: “calibration” and “discriminant”
validity. 65 Calibration, discussed here, measures
the extent to which a positive finding (that a
person will recidivate) is correct, and the extent
to which a negative finding (that a person will
not recidivate) is correct. Discriminant validity,
discussed next, measures the extent to which an
RAI has differentiated between recidivists and
non-recidivists, and thus provides a measure of
how much better than chance an RAI performs.

When the legal-decisionmaker is
attempting to fashion a disposition to reduce
risk, also possibly relevant is the considerable
research that finds that incarceration can be
criminogenic for a wide range of offenders, given
the resulting loss of connection with family, jobs
and community and the development of criminal
networks that results from imprisonment. 62 A
significant amount of research indicates that
risk-reducing treatment is often most effective
when it takes place in the community. 63 In part

Among tool developers, the positive
predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive
value (NPV) are often thought to be the most
12

relevant measures of calibration. 66 The question
the PPV answers is how often a tool’s prediction
that someone will recidivate is correct, and the
NPV indicates how often a tool’s prediction that
a person will not recidivate is correct. Usually
the PPV is calculated with a confidence interval
of 95% (meaning that the range provided by the
interval has a 95% chance of correctly identifying
the group’s risk level).

what they should claim to be doing. RAIs cannot
identify who will recidivate and who will not
recidivate. Rather, as noted above, they can only
associate a particular score or category with a
group probability of reoffending.
Thus, while PPV can help figure out how
well an RAI is calibrated, a more legally relevant
measure of calibration is what could be called
the category positive predictive value, or
category base rate (CBR), 70 which answers the
following three-part question: (1) does the RAI
associate a person with a category (a score,
decile or risk group); (2) if so, what percentage of
people in the category does it predict will
recidivate in the way defined by the relevant law;
and (3) to what extent is that percentage correct,
as measured by validation studies and confidence intervals? An example of this type of RAI
is the VRAG. That tool assigns people with certain scores to nine bins associated with specific
ascending probability ranges of recidivating.

For instance, using a sample dataset
from the COMPAS which divided offenders into
high, medium and low risk groups, Melissa
Hamilton calculated that the PPV for those
designated as a high risk of violent reoffending is
49%, with a confidence interval range of 43% to
55%; 67 in other words, there is a 95% chance that
a high risk score on the COMPAS is associated
with a 43 to 55% probability of recidivating. *
Hamilton also found that the NPV of the medium
and low risk group examined together was 86%,
with a confidence interval range of 85% to 87%,
meaning that there is a 95% chance that a
medium or low risk score is associated with an
85 to 87% chance of not recidivating.68 When,
instead, Hamilton lumped together the medium
and high-risk groups, separate from the low risk
group, the PPV with respect to whether the first
group recidivated fell to 31% (29% to 34%) and
the NPV with respect to whether the second
group did not recidivate went up slightly to 89%
(88% to 91%). 69

From a legal perspective, the CBR is the
key measure of validity. RAIs that fail to provide
CBRs obscure the normative decision about
whether the risk an individual’s group poses
warrants some type of legal intervention.
Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, some RAIs
do not use scores or other categories, or do so,
but associate them only with deciles or
undefined high, medium and low risk labels
rather than with probabilities.

This example illustrates two important
points.
First, the PPV and NPV can be
manipulated by changing the cut-point (for
instance, as Hamilton did, from the high category
to the high-medium category combined).
Second, to arrive at PPV and NPV, one has to
assume that the cut-off, whatever it is, is
equivalent to a prediction that the individuals in
those groups will recidivate. In fact, that is not
what most RAIs claim to be doing, or at least not

In some cases, a policy-making body
approves the cut-off scores, based on an
assessment of CBR and other measures of
validation. For instance, in Virginia, the
legislature directed the state sentencing
commission to develop an instrument that
flagged the lowest 25% in terms of risk; the
resulting instrument recommends alternatives
to imprisonment for that group. 71 Thus, the
suggests that the reported proportion should be the focus
of the risk assessment.

*

It should be noted that the confidence interval range
could skew toward over or under prediction, which
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Virtually all RAIs have AUCs above .5,
with most developers reporting AUCs of .6 to
.85. 74 The latter figure means that, 85% of the
time, a randomly selected recidivist receives a
higher score on the tool than a randomly
selected non-recidivist. Social scientists have
designated a .56 AUC as a small effect size, .64 as
a moderate effect size, and .71 as a large effect
size. 75 Ultimately, however, the discriminant
validity threshold should be legally determined.

Virginia legislature mandated the legally
relevant cut-off score that legal decision-makers
should consider. However, if this type of upperlevel policy decision has not taken place, the
legal decision-maker should always endeavor to
ascertain the CBR for an individual’s risk
category.
6. What evidence is provided about the
ability of the RAI to differentiate
between recidivists and non-recidivists?

As an evidentiary matter, the AUC value
can be thought of as a measure of relevance,
which under the rules of every state requires
that proffered evidence have a “tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action
[here reoffending] more probable or less
probable than it would be without the
evidence.” 76 Under this definition, the results of
an RAI—even one with a useful PPV—that has an
AUC of .5 or close to it might be considered
irrelevant. Such an instrument’s designation of
someone as high risk or low risk is no more
accurate than a random designation of
individuals as either high or low risk (the
proverbial coin flip). An adequate AUC threshold
might be particularly important to enforce in
settings known to involve populations with low
base rates of offending, such as offenders
convicted of capital murder who will clearly be
incarcerated for the foreseeable future.

An RAI can have very good calibration—
that is, its probability forecasts may be borne
out—but can still be of questionable predictive
validity. For instance, when a given sample has
a low base rate of reoffending (say 5%), an RAI
might do no better than “a naïve classifier that
predicts that no one recidivates,” 72 since such a
classifier would be right 95% of the time. Yet the
resulting classifications would be useless to
decision-makers who want to separate those
who are high risk from those who are not. In
recognition of this problem, another measure of
predictive validity, one that examines the extent
to which an RAI can discriminate between high
and low risk individuals independently of how
accurately it identifies absolute risk levels,
should be sought and provided.
The most popular such measure is called
the AUC, for Area Under the Curve. The “curve”
is created by plotting, for each point total or cut
point (e.g., decile) of the instrument, the true
positive rate or “sensitivity” (the rate at which
those who recidivated received that score)
against the true negative rate or “specificity”
(the rate at which those who did not recidivate
received that score). 73 If the curve created by
this plot is a diagonal, the AUC is .5, and
represents a finding that the tool does no better
than chance at designating those who
recidivated from those who did not, whereas a
curve that looks like an “r” would indicate a
perfect ability to do so.

7. Has the RAI been validated on the
jurisdiction’s population and with
respect to important sub-groupings?
An RAI is usually developed on half a
sample (the development sample) and then
tested on the other half of the sample (the
validation sample) to see how well it performs.
But to be optimally useful in jurisdictions outside
of the one in which the RAI was developed, the
RAI should perform well in those jurisdictions as
well. 77 One of the initial criticisms of the VRAG is
that it was validated on a sample of incarcerated
14

that was validated on the majority population to
assess the risk of a person from an indigenous
group. 84

white men with mental disability in Canada.
Until it was tested on diverse populations in the
United States, its validity with respect to those
populations was suspect. 78
Likewise, RAI
validation should be attentive to the type of
population that will be evaluated. An RAI
validated on a population of sex offenders, using
sexual assault as the outcome variable, will be of
limited use for assessing the risk of other types
of offenders. 79 An instrument validated on a
sample in an urban area might not work well in
rural areas with lower crime rates and fewer
arrest and convictions. 80

In short, to be valid, an RAI should have
similar positive predictive values for each risk
classification across as many major demographic
groups as possible, and have a similar AUC for
each demographic group as well. 85 This may
require separate instruments (with different risk
factors) for some groups, such as people of color,
women, and so on (the legal implications of
which are discussed in connection with query
#13 below). Achieving this degree of validation
can be difficult, because it requires large enough
samples to arrive at statistically useful findings in
each of these types of categories. Nonetheless,
from an empirical perspective, serious effort
should be made to validate the RAI on a
population as similar as possible to the
offender’s reference group. Otherwise, even a
tool which, on its face, has satisfactory
calibration and discriminant accuracy verges on
being irrelevant, a possibility that several courts
have noted. 86

Finally, calibration and discriminant
validity should also be tested with respect to
important demographic groups within the
jurisdiction, to ensure predictive validity is
maintained for those groups. Research for many
of the most widely used instruments shows that
calibration and discriminant validity do not vary
significantly for most groups. 81 But they can. For
instance, Hamilton demonstrates that, for the
males in the COMPAS sample described in query
#5, the CBR goes up for each of the ten deciles,
meaning that the predicted probability of
recidivism and the actual rate of recidivism for
each decile are fairly closely aligned. However,
for the female part of the sample, the CBR does
not align well with actual recidivism from the
fourth decile on, and drops precipitously at the
seventh through ten deciles (with females in the
higher risk categories recidivating at a much
lower rate than males). 82

8. What evidence is there concerning interrater reliability of evaluators who use the
RAI?
To a social scientist, reliability means
repeatability, the ability to produce similar
results under similar circumstances. An RAI that
has good calibration, discriminant, and external
validity may still not produce valid results if it
cannot be administered reliably. Some RAIs, like
the HCR-20, rely on numerous “soft variables,”
such as “lack of insight,” “negative attitudes,”
and “impulsivity.” These types of variables are
subject to many interpretations. Even more
objective instruments, such as the VRAG, include
items that can suffer from poor inter-rater
reliability, such as the individual’s score on the
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised and his or her
psychiatric diagnosis. Unless evaluators measure
these types of factors in a way that is consistent

AUC values can also differ depending on
ethnicity. Using the COMPAS sample, Hamilton
calculated that the AUC for blacks (at the 95%
confidence level) is .71 (.68 to .74), for whites .68
(64 to .73) and for Hispanics .64 (.55 to .73). 83
For Hispanics, the AUC on the COMPAS comes
perilously close to dipping below an acceptable
level of relevance. In recognition of this type of
problem, in 2018, the Canadian Supreme Court
prohibited use of a risk assessment instrument
15

to carry out this type of review. CBRs, AUCs and
reliability data that have been replicated by such
experts, ideally in the same setting in which the
RAI is being used, instill confidence that the RAI
is reliable in both the legal and scientific sense.

with the how they were conceptualized by the
tool’s developers, the chance that the same
individual will receive different scores from
different evaluators or that similar individuals
will receive different scores from the same
evaluator is significant. 87

10. Has the person or persons using the RAI
been trained in its use, are the
evaluator’s conclusions about the
individual’s risk factors accurate, and is
the risk score calculated properly?

A survey of 53 studies in 2013 found that
only two reported inter-rater reliability. 88
Ideally, this information would be reported for
every RAI. An agreement ratio of 80% among
raters is considered very good. 89

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states that
the basis of expert testimony must derive from
reliable methods and principles, “reliably
applied.” 95 While evidentiary rules like this one
are not formally applicable to post-conviction
proceedings in many jurisdictions, the basic
principle should not be ignored where
deprivations of liberty are at stake. Applied to
risk assessments, this language makes it
incumbent on the decision-maker to ensure that
the evaluator has been trained in using the
particular RAI, and has relied on trustworthy
information sources in gathering relevant data. 96
It also requires some assessment of whether the
scoring and assignment of the individual to a
particular risk group was carried out in a
competent manner.

9. How current is the evidence supporting
the RAI’s validity?
All of the measures of accuracy
discussed to this point can alter for a particular
instrument if, for instance, the population on
which the RAI was normed changes
substantially, the jurisdiction’s crime, arrest or
conviction rates go up or down significantly, or
the jurisdiction begins implementing innovative
alternatives to prison that can reduce risk. 90
Because the potential for offending is affected
by these types of factors, a person rated high risk
on an outdated instrument may actually belong
to a group that is low risk, or vice versa. For that
reason, RAIs should be re-validated periodically.
Many of the most prominent instruments have
been revised based on new data. For instance,
Virginia’s sentencing RAIs have been revalidated twice since 2001. 91

11. If the legal decision-maker is
contemplating “adjusting” the risk score,
are there valid empirical or practical
reasons for doing so that have not
already been considered by the
developers of the RAI?

Other measures of current validity
include case auditing and peer review. 92 Tools
tested in the field rarely do as well as they did
during validation. Periodic auditing of how they
are implemented by evaluators is one way of
ensuring RAIs are performing adequately. 93
Virginia, for instance, provides annual reports on
its RAIs. 94

One survey of judges who use an RAI
found that even those who were highly favorable
toward the instrument “were still inclined to
consider recommendations in the context of
their own judicial intuition and experience, and
would request information that was not included
in the risk assessment instrument when they
deemed this to be necessary.” 97 The conclusion
of one judge is typical: “It’s important to

The best way to ensure current validity
is through peer review, carried out by
researchers who did not develop the instrument.
University-based experts are often best situated
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understand that it’s just a tool and that judges
are the definitive answer.” 98 The judicial
decisions that have analyzed the use of RAIs at
sentencing have likewise emphasized that the
results of an RAI is but one factor to consider and
should not be dispositive. 99

Erroneous adjustments upward, to a higher risk
label, may be influenced by knowledge that a
false negative decision, which results in release,
is much more likely to be discovered than a false
positive decision that results in incarceration;
moreover, of course, the latter types of errors
are much more likely to have professional and
societal consequences. 105 In contrast, erroneous
decisions downward may reflect concern about
whether sufficient treatment resources are
available in prison; if not, judges have been
known to opt for a prison alternative that
appears to better serve the individual (although
here the override is more likely to be warranted,
if the RAI has not taken the community
treatment into account). 106 More generally,
evaluators, judges, and parole board members
might dislike the idea of having their decisions
dictated by a table; as one Virginia judge put it,
“I don’t do voodoo.” 107 Unfortunately, because
these adjustments to the RAI result are at best
based on untested assumptions derived from
experience, they may not only be wrong but also
infected by racial and other biases, a possibility
some courts have noted. 108

If these statements are merely meant to
stress that sentencing judges should always
consider other purposes of punishment besides
risk and incapacitation, they are unremarkable.
But if these statements are asserting that, even
when focused solely on the question of risk, legal
decision-makers should feel free to secondguess the results of a well-validated RAI, they
should be tempered with the knowledge that
such adjustments can easily reduce accuracy.
Consistent with the findings about RAIs’
incremental validity compared to decisions
made by lay factfinders, evaluator and judicial
adjustments usually do not improve on the
actuarial assessment. In fact, several studies find
that professional “overrides” of an RAI’s risk
estimate, whether by judges, probation officers
or other correctional professionals, decrease
accuracy in predicting offending. 100
For
example, based on a sample of 3,646 offenders,
Guay & Parent found that adjustments to an RAI
result made by probation officers were
significantly less accurate than the unadjusted
RAI. 101 A study by Schmidt et al. found that
professional overrides decreased predictive
validity and usually increased risk level. 102 The
most recent study likewise found that overrides
typically result in an “upward reshuffling” of risk,
and a loss of predictive accuracy. 103

The dangers of adjusting a risk level in
the absence of supporting research is
particularly high with upward adjustments. 109
Most RAIs consist primarily of risk factors, not
protective factors, so the reason for rating a
person as a higher risk than the RAI indicates can
easily be something that has already been taken
into account. One of the common mistakes in
this regard is to “double-count” criminal history.
For instance, a judge might decide that even
though an RAI indicates an offender poses a low
risk, the sentence should be enhanced because
the offender has committed two prior offenses;
research in Virginia indicates that is precisely
what happens there. 110 Since every RAI already
incorporates criminal history into its algorithm,
this assessment will almost certainly be
erroneous,
and
thus
decrease
the

There are likely several explanations for
these types of findings. Adjustments may be
based on unverified speculation about the traits
that might affect risk, a belief that “special
circumstances” (e.g., contriteness or surliness)
warrant ignoring the risk score, or simple
mistrust of quantified decision-making. 104 Or
they may stem from extraneous considerations.
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equal protection principles. This can occur in at
least two ways. First, as discussed above (see
query #7), in an attempt to improve accuracy, an
RAI may be calibrated for each major ethnic
group, an adjustment that might be called “raceconscious calibration.” Second, in an effort to
assure what some commentators have called
“classification parity,” false positive rates could
be adjusted. For instance, if an RAI produces
higher false positive rates for blacks or other
ethnic groups than for whites, risk categories
could be adjusted so that the risk scores for
people of color are lowered or the risk scores for
whites are raised.

reliability/validity of the risk assessment enterprise.
In contrast, relevant protective factors—
that is, again, traits that are correlated with
lower risk—are less likely to have been
considered during the development of an RAI.
Further, certain types of interventions can
reduce risk. If an individual is able to produce
research showing the presence of protective
factors not considered in the RAI’s development,
or that a particular intervention that fits his or
her criminogenic needs is available, a downward
adjustment or some alternative to prison may be
indicated. In practice, RAI-overrides that can be
justified on solid evidence will normally be in the
downward direction.

Both race-conscious calibration and
classification parity explicitly use race as a
discriminator, a fact that implicates the equal
protection clause. 111 There is a key difference
between the two types of adjustments,
however. Unlike classification parity—which
changes an accurate conclusion about the
statistical likelihood of recidivism to achieve its
version of fairness—race-conscious calibration
serves the important state interests of
protecting the public and avoiding unnecessary
incarceration, by rectifying the impact of
discriminatory practices that unfairly raise one’s
risk score. As between the two, race conscious
calibration is more likely to survive an equal
protection challenge.

Justice/Fairness
The legal decision-maker should
evaluate the fairness of RAIs by ensuring that:
(1) disparate impacts on major demographic
groups can be justified on empirical grounds; (2)
the instrument does not rely on risk factors that
are barred from consideration by the
jurisdiction; (3) the risk factors and how they
were combined are accessible to all parties,
including the subject of the risk assessment;
and (4) the subject of the risk assessment is
provided an explanation of the risk factors and
the empirical logic behind the RAI, is able to
contest the RAI analysis of risk factors and its
results, and can present evidence of protective
factors.

While no RAI explicitly incorporates race
as a risk factor (and, according to the Supreme
Court, would clearly be unconstitutional if it did
so 112), sex—specifically, maleness—is a risk
factor in several RAIs. Developers have realized
that an RAI that is well-calibrated for men may
not be well-calibrated for women; women do
not recidivate as often as men, apparently even
when they are otherwise associated with
identical risk factors. From an empirical point of
view, that situation calls for an RAI validated on
a female population. But, again, such an explicit
use of a protected class could be seen to be

12. Are there data that provide information
about the impact of the RAI on different
racial groups and other important
groups?
Race and sex are protected classes
under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. An unresolved legal
question is whether attempts to avoid unfair
impacts on these two groups by taking race or
sex into account in constructing an RAI violates
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violative of the equal protection clause. For
instance, in Craig v. Boren, 113 the Supreme Court
struck down a law that allowed women to buy
alcohol at age 18 while prohibiting alcohol sales
to males until they are 21, despite evidence that
men have higher rates of drunk driving.

itself stated that “a sentencing court can
consider a defendant’s employment history and
financial resources in setting an initial
punishment,” 120 and emphasized that the only
sentencing practice it was barring was the use of
poverty “as the sole justification for
imprisonment,” 121 which no risk assessment
instrument does.

Nonetheless, in Wisconsin v. Loomis 114
the Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested that
discriminating on the basis of sex is permissible
if it validly helps distinguish between males and
females in terms of risk. Loomis’ sentence had
been enhanced using the COMPAS, which
specifically took gender into account; Loomis
argued that this disposition violated due process.
Although as a result of this framing, the
Wisconsin court did not explicitly address the
equal protection issue, it did state, in the course
of rejecting Loomis’ claim, that “it appears that
any risk assessment tool which fails to
differentiate between men and women will
misclassify both genders.” 115 In essence, the
court was saying, because of its enhancement to
accuracy, incorporating gender was a narrowly
tailored means of meeting the state’s interest in
preventing harm to the public in a cost-efficient
manner.

This does not mean that any wealthrelated risk factor is fair game. Following equal
protection’s tiered analysis, the use of factors
other than race and sex—such as age,
employment status, home life as a child,
diagnosis or marital status—must still have a
rational basis.
Because of their minimal
predictive value, for instance, employment and
marital status were eventually dropped from
Virginia’s NVRA. 122
Finally, an RAI might give rise to a
disparate impact claim rather than a disparate
treatment claim. Again, however, if an RAI uses
neither race nor sex as a risk factor, but only
produces results that have a disparate racial or
gender impact, then formal classification is not
occurring, and use of the RAI is permissible if
there is any rational basis for doing so, unless a
discriminatory purpose can be shown. While the
Supreme Court has not always required serious
animus in its disparate impact cases, it has
tended to require strong proof of discriminatory
purpose in criminal cases. 123 In any event,
developers of RAIs are not likely to have
harbored or intended to implement animus
toward any given racial group, and in fact
presumably want to avoid disproportionate
outcomes. 124 Thus, a disparate impact argument
against RAIs is unlikely to prevail.

Of the factors typically found in RAIs,
only race and sex trigger Fourteenth
Amendment protection and thus require more
than a rational basis for their use under current
law. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment also bars RAIs from
using poverty or proxies for it (e.g.,
unemployment,
location,
or
house
ownership), 116 based primarily on the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement in Bearden v. Georgia 117
that revoking parole for an offender who has
failed to pay a fine “would be little more than
punishing him for his poverty,” and “is contrary
to fundamental fairness.” 118 However, no court
has interpreted Bearden to mean that factors
related to poverty are anathema in assessing
either risk or punishment generally; 119 Bearden

13. Do any of the risk factors in the RAI rely
on traits that the jurisdiction’s law
prohibits legal decision-makers from
considering at sentencing?
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Independent of equal protection
concerns are enactments that specifically
prohibit reliance on certain types of factors in
punishment decisions. For instance, Ohio law
states that “A court that imposes a sentence
upon an offender for a felony shall not base the
sentence upon the race, ethnic background,
gender, or religion of the offender,” 125 and
Tennessee law provides that “Sentencing should
exclude all considerations respecting race,
gender, creed, religion, national origin, and
social status of the individual.” 126 Thus, for
instance, both statutes could be construed to bar
sex as a risk factor, regardless of the effect of
that prohibition on accuracy. Furthermore,
Tennessee’s prohibition on punishment that
considers the “social status of the individual”
might bar consideration of any factors having to
do with income, employment, marital status,
and the like. It is a matter of state law whether
a sentence that relies in whole or part on an RAI
that incorporates such factors is “based” on
those factors or explicitly “considers” them. If
so, use of RAIs that include such factors may be
impermissible.

publicly developed instruments can be less than
transparent. Congress required that the RAI
developed under the federal First Step Act, the
PATTERN, be made public, 129 but did not require
that the validation procedure that led to
development of the instrument nor the data
underlying it be disclosed. When asked for more
information, the authors of PATTERN stated that
state law-driven privacy concerns prevented
release even of anonymized versions of the data
to outside researchers.130 A number of states
have responded to similar requests in the same
fashion. 131
The integration of sophisticated
machine learning into RAI construction could
make RAIs even more opaque, since under some
versions of that technique the weights assigned
risk factors and even the identity of those factors
are inaccessible to humans. 132 Furthermore,
even if the black box can be opened, serious
interpretation problems can arise.
More
specifically, as Andrew Selbst and Simon Barocas
note, some versions of machine learning can be
either “inscrutable”—meaning that even when a
model is available for direct inspection it may
“defy understanding”—or “non-intuitive”—
meaning that even where a model is
understandable it may “rest on apparent
statistical relationships that defy intuition.” 133

14. Are the RAI’s risk factors and the weights
assigned to them accessible to peer
reviewers, evaluators, legal decisionmakers and the subjects of the risk
assessment?

Even if it turns out that advanced RAIs
are demonstrably more accurate than simpler
versions (which is unlikely 134), and putting aside
whether actuarial instruments need to be
intuitively understandable, algorithms that are
“inscrutable” are problematic. 135 Neither equal
protection nor statutory analysis of the type just
described can take place unless the legal
decision-maker can discern the risk factors in an
RAI. The accuracy of the probabilities and other
results reached by an RAI cannot be confirmed
unless the underlying data and the empirical
analysis using it can be evaluated by others. If
decision-makers want to avoid “adjustments” of

Some RAIs are developed by private
companies that claim trade secret protection
over the algorithm. For instance, the company
that produces the COMPAS claims its algorithm
and the weights it assigns risk factors are
protected, a claim that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld.127 In such a situation, the identity
and importance of risk factors can be difficult to
discern. For instance, sophisticated reverse
engineering was required to figure out that,
while the COMPAS contains over 100 items, over
half of the risk score is attributable to a single
factor, the offender’s age. 128 Even purportedly
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While Roviaro has been given short shrift in more
recent lower court decisions, 140 its central
rationale has not been abandoned. 141

a risk assessment based on factors already
considered in developing the instrument they
need to know what those factors are. Perhaps
most importantly, without transparency litigants
cannot adequately contest the facts leading to
the RAI’s results.

Scholars have also made sub-constitutional arguments in favor of open algorithms.
Danielle Citron has contended that private
companies that seek public money for products
that affect public policy should not be able to
hide behind trade secret laws, 142 and Rebecca
Wexler has noted that companies’ concern
about algorithmic disclosure giving competitors
an advantage or discouraging innovation are
overblown, especially if protective orders or in
camera review requirements are imposed. 143
The opacity problems created by machine
learning have received special attention. Most
prominently, scholars have argued for a “right to
explanation,” 144 a right that the European Union
has explicitly recognized in its General Data
Privacy Regulation. 145

To aid both independent peer reviewers
and those involved in the legal process,
developers should provide “a complete description of the design and testing process . . . ,
[a] list of factors that the tool uses and how it
weighs them, [t]he thresholds and data used to
determine labels for risk scores, . . . [t]he
outcome data used to develop and validate the
tool at an aggregate and privacy-protecting
level--disclosing breakdown of rearrests by
charge, severity of charge, failures to appear,
age, race, and gender—[and] clear definitions of
what an instrument forecasts and for what time
period.” 136
Some caselaw backs up these
requirements. In Gardner v. Florida, 137 the
defendant argued that, before his sentence was
imposed, he had a due process right to discover
and rebut the contents of his pre-sentence
report. The Supreme Court agreed, stating:
“Our belief that debate between adversaries is
often essential to the truth-seeking function of
trials requires us also to recognize the
importance of giving counsel an opportunity to
comment on facts which may influence the
sentencing decision . . . ”. 138 While Gardner was
limited to the death penalty context, the Court
came to a similar conclusion in Roviaro v. United
States, 139 a simple drug case. There, the Court
held that the identity of confidential informants
must be revealed to the defendant when the
informant possesses facts that are highly
relevant to the defense. Roviaro establishes that
even strong claims of a need for secrecy (here
protecting an informant) should not prevail
when the information is crucial to the case.

15. Are the subjects of the risk assessment
provided an explanation of the empirical
basis of the RAI and the opportunity to
contest and rebut its results?
In State v. Guise, Judge Appel stated:
“[O]ne thing is clear: if the state intends to offer
risk assessments for the court to rely upon in
sentencing, the defendant has a right to an
adequate opportunity to attack it. If the court
does not give the defendant an adequate
opportunity to attack the statistical evidence, it
should not be utilized in sentencing.” 146 Yet in
many jurisdictions, the adversarial process
provided at criminal trials does not exist postconviction. Even at sentencing, the adjudication
process can be very informal, at least outside of
capital cases. 147 Defendants are entitled to be
present during sentencing, but do not have a
right to testify in the normal sense, only a right
to “allocution” (a statement by the defendant
that can be restricted to a plea for mercy); 148
funding for expert testimony is also minimal
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outside of capital cases. 149 In most states and in
federal court, neither Daubert nor any rule
resembling it applies at sentencing. 150 The
process due at other post-conviction
proceedings is even more minimal.151 All of this
makes relevance, accuracy and fairness
challenges difficult.

risk assessments, the courts in each
jurisdiction, 157 have taken on the task. In the
federal First Step Act, Congress directed that (1)
the Attorney General develop and release a “risk
and needs assessment system” to determine the
“recidivism risk of each prisoner” following “an
objective and statistically validated method,” (2)
a panel of researchers approve the instrument,
(3) the instrument be annually validated, and (4)
Bureau of Prison staff “demonstrate
competence in administering the System,
including interrater reliability, on a biannual
basis.” 158 While the analysis of the RAI could be
under the auspices of the department of
corrections or the sentencing commission,
ideally the type of research panel referred to in
the Act would consist of experts outside of the
department, perhaps at a university, as
suggested in the discussion of query #9.

In the absence of a full-blown
adversarial
process,
other
procedural
components are crucial. Most importantly, the
subject of the risk assessment should be able to
raise claims about whether the RAI was reliably
administered, in two ways. First, the subject
should be able to attack the accuracy of a
conclusion that a particular risk factor is present
(e.g., the validity of an assumed arrest or
conviction, the applicability of a diagnosis, or the
failure to complete a program that in fact was
not available to the offender). Second, the
subject should be able to proffer protective
factors that were not considered by the
developers of the instrument (e.g., completion
of a treatment or educational program, changes
in employment status); researchers are
beginning to identify a number of such factors. 152
Third, the state’s evaluator should provide
information about any perceived protective
factors that the subject does not identify,
especially when subjects do not have access to
their own experts. As a supplement to these
process rights, the legal decision-maker should
provide a written explanation for any decision
based on risk, one that should be particularly
detailed if an adjustment to the RAI results
occurs.

This type of independent review of RAIs
would also take the burden off individual legal
decision-makers, who might have difficulty
answering many of the inquiries outlined in this
primer. In fact, such a panel could presumptively
resolve many of the relevance, validity, and
fairness issues described above. Specifically,
while the issues set out in 4 (selecting riskreducing interventions), 10 (ensuring the
evaluator has been adequately trained and has
properly scored the RAI), 11 (deciding whether
adjustments to the RAI results should occur), 14
(ensuring that the contents of the RAI are
accessible), and 15 (ensuring adequate
adversarial testing) would have to be handled by
judges, parole boards and correctional officials
on a case-by-case basis, the remaining issues
could be addressed in the first instance by the
outside entity.

RAIs should also be subject to legislative
and administrative review. A number of state
legislatures have mandated that sentencing
judges or corrections officials use a “validated
risk assessment tool,” 153 and in other states the
state sentencing commission, 154 the department
of corrections, 155 the state courts generally, 156
or, as California has done with respect to pretrial

CONCLUSION—THE NEED FOR A JURISPRUDENCE OF RISK
Until recently, the post-conviction use
of risk assessment instruments has received little
attention from the legal community, at least in
22

properties that ensure courts will rely on the
instrument they develop. In the meantime, to
the extent risk assessment influences the postconviction process, the fate of offenders, the
safety of the public, and even the pace of
incarceration rates are subject to a hodgepodge
of inchoate views about the impact an offender’s
risk should have on disposition. In addition to
providing useful information to legal decisionmakers about risk assessment instruments, a
central aim of this primer is to encourage further
development of this jurisprudence of risk.

comparison to the vast literature focused on
defining crimes, defenses, and the amount of
punishment that particular types of offenders
“deserve.” Without a jurisprudence of risk,
judges and other legal decision-makers have
very little guidance on which risk assessment
instruments, if any, are worthy of consideration,
how to evaluate their results, and how much
weight to give those results. Researchers who
develop these instruments do not have a clear
idea of the outcome measures that the law
considers relevant, the types of risk factors they
may or may not consider, or the psychometric
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